It’s time for U.S. to treat rare earths as power. China already does

In April 2025. year, China has imposed new export controls to seven rare elements of the country, and permanent magnets obtained from them – materials forming the foundation of modern life and modern warfare. Combat nozzles, missilesElectric vehicles, drones, wind turbines, and even data centers rely on high-performance magnets made of these critical minerals. By limiting their flow, Beijing didn’t just bend his industrial muscles, he discovered America and the rest of dangerous vulnerability in the world. Last actions in China show their readiness and ability to weapons of American and global addiction.

This is not a new challenge. The United States has known for more than 15 years that its critical supply chains of mineral supply were too concentrated, too fragile and too exposed to the Chinese lever and control. Nevertheless, through democratic and republic administrations, we failed to respond to urgency or coherence. Now, the consequences of these failures caught us next door and cascades are in our commercial and defensive sectors.

After London conversations, the Washington and Beijing announced on Friday New trade framework Under which China will continue approving export licenses for rare countries over the next six months. American officials have publicly expanded breakthrough – but they offered several details about what was given in return. It leaves the main questions without answering: What were American compromise? How will they arrange? And what happens when it’s six months up?

Skepticism is high. Ford recently stopped production at the Chicago Factory due to the lack of magnet – underlining that even short-term delivery interruptions have real consequences. Paper contracts are not solutions to supply chain. Without transparency, timely approval and long-term planning, it could easily become another diplomatic cycle of one step forward, two steps.

Even this limited return carries risks. They described dozens of companies in Europe and North America The Chinese exporter process is very invasive – Requiring companies for delivering detailed production data, extremely use applications, pictures of objects, customer names and transaction history. Some applicants were refused because they were not providing photographs or documentation of their end users.

Managers say the process is “official extraction of information”.

Although companies are advised not to share sensitive IP, omission of key details can mean unspecified delays. For companies in defense chains, implications are alarming: valuable commercial intelligence could be used for a competitor folder, interference between the price or advance Chinese replacement.

This is not only licensing – it is competitive oversight. And while the United States is built, independent capacity through critical mineral supply chains, remains exposed to data risks and risks.

This vulnerability did not happen overnight. Many watched this train wreck in years. In 2010, China broke the rare export of land in Japan during maritime dispute, a clear warning recorded the observed US, but was baked. In 2014. The Obama administration won the cases in VTO against Chinese export restrictions, but misduced that legal success would distract further manipulation.

Which Trump did biden do

The first Trump administration identified rare countries as critical, but they are specially exempt from 2018. Chinese tariffs, perhaps unsaid by American addiction. To date, Biden has taken the most appropriate approach: Executive order 14017, critical working groups of minerals and financing IIA and IRA. Strategic partnerships such as a partnership for the safety of minerals. But progress was slow, distracting delay permits and uneven federal obligations.

The second Trump administration returned with more aggressive measures, referring to Section 232, activating the Law on Defense Production and proposing large financing incentives in FI2026. The National Chamber on the Domination of Energy now coordinates efforts. However, these measures, such as the Chinese six-month delay, still lacking the covering of Beijing’s grip. And crucial, the defensive sector remains severed, not such a licensing window.

The recent G7 Summit in Canada underestimated global roles. European Commission President Ursula von der Leien Direct accused China “weapons” of her control Over key materials such as rare countries, calling the United G7 response. Result: a G7 Critical Action Plan for Minerals. Although China is not mentioned by name, the subtext was infallible. The plan commits members of the G7 to raise ESG and standards for key resources; Mobilize capital for new projects in critical mining and mineral processing; and cooperate on innovation in recycling, substitution and refined technologies.

Predictively Beijing reacted with anger. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the plan as a “excuse” for protectionism, claiming that the G7 was encouraged by the conflict of fear of losing market share.

Brussels now signals that trading negotiations with Beijing are effectively stopping, so that the prospects of Chinese retaliation are – especially against the EU – grow. If China doubles, it risks to push the EU, Japan, South Korea, and India in Washington orbit – exactly what Beijing hopes to avoid.

Chinese dominant position in the rare mining of the country

Raw numbers are stunned. China consists of approximately 70% of the global rare mining mining, but over 90% of refining capacity. Products 92% of world neodic iron (NDFEB) magnets – used in everything from submarines to Teslas. This domination is not accidental. China Subsidized processing, focused on global acquisitions through supply chain and scales production much faster than the West can approve and issue permits for one mine.

American places like MP Materials“Mountain passage and round tip remain incomplete by the transaction. Dod and the FI2026 Trump budget seems to expand the capacity of mineral and secure access to critical mineral and the portial and long-term industrial command and sector control.

China moved early and decidedly to Africa and Latin, partnership with governments in the democratic Republic of Congo, Bolivia and Chile; Investment in ports, rails and infrastructure refining. In contrast, American efforts and engagement on these sets of issues performed and the values ​​of the forward, priority of transparency and management, really important issues, but deliver limited momentum of critical mineral issues. Even a recent power with Ukraine and the Democratic Republic of Congo remain symbolically, distracted by conflict and instability in these countries.

London conversations and recent trading bids have shopped forward. But time without a strategy is not fruitful. Chinese licensing mode remains intact, its data requirements that cannot be smooth. The defense sector remains excluded. Meanwhile, congress threats in free energy and energy financing and industrial policies could stop Rare-countries projects just as they get tow.

This is a crucial moment. China is betting that American internal divisions will – between the workforce, industry, ecologists, tribal peoples and political fractions – prevent the type of unique, constant effort required for the competition. Maybe they’re right. Now they have to prove them wrong.

Critical minerals are geopolitical power

The United States must now treat critical minerals not as goods, but as geopolitical power instruments. China is already working. To escape your capture will require more than mines and short-term financing permits. It requires a coherent, long-term strategy for building a complete supply chain that does not involve not only domestic possibilities, but also reliable allies and partners. From mining and refining to the production and recycling of magnets, each link must be strengthened by targeted investments, by allowing reform and strategic coordination.

Successful and sustainable policy requires commitment of one presidency to another. We could not afford to hire allies and partners only rhetorically. Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chile and Indonesia (among other things) needed partnerships supported by financing, technology transfer and critical infrastructure investment, and not only our lectures on management.

Six-month export vacation from China is not a solution – it is a stress test. It reveals if the United States can finally focus and act or will retire. Beijing bets it will be the last. Washington must respond to the emergency, unity and strategy equal to the scope of challenges. There’s still time, but not much.

–From Devardic McNealGeneral Manager and Higher Policy Analyst at Longview Global and CNBC Associate